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A large and consolidated body of theoretical and empirical research in the behavioural literature 
postulates or documents the existence of ‘pure or impure’ other-regarding preferences. Most 
of this literature relies on laboratory experiments which show that individuals, beyond their 
self-interested defined desire to increase their monetary endowments and consumption levels, are 
also driven, among others, by other-regarding preferences (Cox, 2004), positive and negative reci- 
procity (Rabin, 1993), social-welfare preferences (Charness and Rabin, 2002), inequity aversion 
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), and different forms of pure and impure 
(warm glow) altruism (Andreoni, 1989 and 1990), which could arise from a mix of unconditional 
and conditional drivers including social approval (Konow, 2009). 
 
In parallel, several theoretical and empirical contributions have investigated the novel and grow- 
ing phenomenon of corporate social responsibility (CSR).1 Most of these empirical studies focus 
1Two institutional definitions of CSR come from the European Commission and the World Bank. According to 
the first (EC, 2001), companies are socially responsible when they “integrate social and environmental concerns in 
their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis”. The World Bank 
agrees with the definition of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD, 2002), according 
to which CSR is “the commitment of business to contribute to sustainable economic development, working with 
employees, their families, the local community and society at large to improve quality of life, in ways that are  
both good for business and good for development”. For literature reviews on CSR see, among others, Kitzmueller 
and Shimshack (2012), Hoi, Wu  and Zhang (2013) and Dhaliwal et al.     (2012). 
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on the relationship between CSR and corporate performance, while theoretical research investi- 
gates the impact of CSR on the traditional welfare goals of standard theoretical models (Baron, 
2003; Besley and Ghatak, 2007; Bénabou and Tirole, 2010). This literature shows that, in a 
framework of asymmetric information, signalling a CSR stance has a positive effect on sales not 
only because of (unconditional or social context dependent) other-regarding preferences, but also 
because CSR is perceived as a signal of product quality (see among others, Siegel and Vitaliano, 
2007; and Elfenbein and McManus, 2010). 
 
 
The novelty of the present paper lies in the establishment of a nexus between behavioural eco- 
nomics and CSR, by means of a randomised field experiment in which a ‘school report-like’ 
poster scorecard with detailed scores in different CSR subjects for the ten largest world food 
companies is located at the entrance of selected supermarkets. This means we cannot inter- 
pret our findings just in terms of a simple brand salience effect. Instead, we are able to test  
the impact of CSR information on consumer choices thereby reducing problems of observational 
equivalence. The information provided to customers when they enter the supermarkets is re- 
trieved from the international Oxfam Behind the Brands campaign. The campaign provides a 
scorecard with summary scores on corporate social and environmental responsibility on seven 
CSR domains (Transparency, Women, Workers, Farmers, Land, Water, and Climate), for each of 
the ten leading world food and beverage corporations. The scores are created by aggregating a 
large number of indicators with a methodology described in detail in the campaign website (see 
section 2 below).2 For each company, the sum of the seven CSR scores gives a summary measure 
that determines its ranking. The scores can be found online on the campaign website where, by 
clicking on icons of the typical brands of the ten companies, web surfers can access their detailed 
scores and are invited to send a message of approval/disapproval to the companies. 
 
 
The originality of our paper, compared to the few similar valuable field experiment contributions 
that focus on the effects of a single poster for a single brand (Hainmueller, Hiscox and Sequeira 
2015), is that signal comprises a comparative ranking which enables us to formulate more complex 
hypotheses on the different effects on top and bottom ranked companies. We have no evidence 
or information of a previous experiment of this kind. There are two main reasons why our 
experiment is original and, to our knowledge, has never been tried before. First, supermarket 
chains tend to be very concerned that a focus on brands different from their own may damage the 
in-house brands because of an invisibility effect. Second, the business relationships supermarkets 
may have with low ranked brands could suffer. Because of these concerns, we were only allowed 
to work in four shops. 
 
The Behind the Brands campaign was designed by Oxfam as a long-term initiative. The score- 
card has been updated five times since the start of the experiment in February 2013 with the 
last update in April 2016. The impact of the campaign at world level is characterised by two 
significant features. First, 31 major investment funds, accounting for nearly 1.5 trillion dollars 
of assets under management, have joined Oxfam’s call on the world’s largest food corporations 
to do more to reduce social and environmental risks in their supply chains. Second, thanks to 
the 700,000 actions undertaken by supporters of the campaign in the three years up to 2016, a 
number of corporations have entered a process of engagement directly with Oxfam. 
 
 
The contribution of this paper is that it enriches and extends a recent research on the impact 
of reputational risk on corporate performance. In addition, the focus of previous papers in this 
2Information on the campaign as well as details on its methodology are available at http://www. 
behindthebrands.org/~/media/Download-files/BtB%20Methodology%20document_final_Sept%202014.ashx. 
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field has not been on randomised experiments. Kölbel and Busch (2013) document how neg- 
ative media attention (proxied by the RepRisk index) tends to worsen credit risk. Minor and 
Morgan (2011) show that the positive reputation of high CSR firms helps them absorb the neg- 
ative consequences of product recalls. Deng, Kang and Low (2013) find that the negative effect 
of stakeholder conflicts in mergers is reduced by high CSR. In most of this literature, CSR is 
mainly viewed within the governance domain, with its positive/negative effects working through 
a channel of trust. Hence, the reaction of the market to low corporate social responsibility is 
not indicative of other-regarding concerns but rather reflects the fear that low CSR may lead to 
poor corporate conduct in the future, thus generating economic losses to both consumers and 
investors. A broader approach used by Brouhle and Khanna (2012) considers the link between 
the awareness of consumers about the quality of products and the level of quality subsequently 




Our paper is the first one to look at those aspects of CSR ranking which are directly concerned 
with environmental and social responsibility along the product chain. As such, these aspects are 
less likely to be related to final consumers self-regarding concerns, even though they may still 
be considered by consumers as proxies of overall corporate quality. In addition to this, the field 
experiment design helps to solve the causality problems often encountered in the above men- 
tioned literature. At the same time, our field experiment does not suffer from the limitations to 
external validity that are typical of laboratory experiments. Last but not least, the focus on final 
consumers is consistent with the growing awareness that consumers’ decisions may be very rele- 
vant for orienting corporate behaviour, as shown by global surveys. In 2013 The Eurobarometer 
asked representative samples of citizens from the 27 EU countries “who should take the leading 
role in influencing companies’ action” (Eurobarometer, 2013). The most frequently selected an- 
swer (49 percent) was “citizens themselves through the purchasing decisions they make”, followed 
by “management of companies through the decision they make about what the company does” 
(40 percent), public authorities through policies and regulations (36 percent), trade unions (28 
percent), investors (22 percent), and NGOs (12 percent). In this perspective it is of foremost 




A closer reference to our work is represented by a narrower set of papers which test the ef- 
fect of green advertising in field experiments. Among them, Hainmueller, Hiscox and Sequeira 
(2015) show that the two most popular coffee brands in their treated supermarkets experience 
an increase in sales by almost 10 percent, under a treatment represented by a Fair Trade label 
compared to a generic placebo label. In a second label-plus-price experiment they find that sales 
of the higher price coffee brand are not significantly different after an 8 percent price increase, 
while demand for the lower priced brand is more elastic since the price increase is associated 
with a 30 percent decline in sales. In another field experiment aimed at testing the willingness 
to pay in online auctions, Hiscox, Broukhim and Litwin (2011) find that shoppers on eBay paid 
a 23 percent premium for Fair Trade labelled coffee. Regarding environmentally responsible 
goods, Vlaeminck, Jiang and Vranken (2014) show that an easily-interpretable label is associ- 
ated with an increase in the market shares of eco-friendly products. The results from these field 
experiments are consistent with the literature showing that reference to social norms has strong 
effects on pro-social behaviour (Griskevicius et al., 2006; Goldstein and Cialdini, 2008). What 
sets our contribution here apart is that we are the first to test the impact of the Oxfam Behind 
the Brands type of campaign and, more generally, to analyse an articulated set of comparative 
scores on CSR of top world companies. 
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Thus, we formulate three distinct research hypotheses. First, we test whether the impact of the 
Behind the Brands scores is significant and consistent with a company’s rank. Second, we test 
whether the marginal increase in the total score is significant per se. Third, we test the effect of 
the treatment on non-ranked companies. 
 
 
Our econometric findings show that the null of insignificance of the poster treatment is violated 
under three main respects. First, the scorecard poster treatment tends to have positive and 
significant effects on the market shares of the top ranked company, and negative and significant 
effects on those of bottom ranked companies with only one exception. Second, the marginal 
increase in the total Behind the Brands score has a positive and significant effect on the market 
shares of ranked companies. Third, the treatment is not neutral on the main non-ranked com- 
panies since the latter experience a negative and significant effect on their market shares. 
 
 
Our results may have important policy implications. If public information on CSR, that is visibly 
available in shops, has a significant effect on consumer choices, then even more comprehensive 
information on the social and environmental responsibility of products may contribute to the 
achievement of social and environmental goals set by policymakers, alongside the more tradi- 
tional tools of regulation and taxes. It should be noted however that the impact of the same 
treatment realised on a wider scale would have general equilibrium effects. Our small scale and 
time limited experiment is not able to evaluate the effect of information overload and medium 
term time dynamics of a larger scale policy that is persistent over time. In this sense our results 
signal the need for further research to extend and generalize findings of the effect of CSR ranking 




2 The Oxfam Behind the Brands   campaign 
 
The Oxfam Behind the Brands campaign focuses on the sourcing policies of the ten largest food 
and beverage companies in the world (Associated British Foods (ABF), Coca-Cola, Danone, 
General Mills, Kellogg, Mars, Mondelez, Nestlé, PepsiCo, and Unilever) according to the Forbes 
2000 annual ranking. Aggregate yearly revenues of these companies amounted) to around $450 
billion at the beginning of the campaign in 2013, the equivalent of the combined GDP of all 
low-income countries in the same year. 
 
The campaign consists of collecting information and creating aggregate scores from a large set 
of indicators in the following seven domains:3 
 
1. Transparency at a corporate level; 
2. Women farm workers and small-scale producers in the supply chain; 
3. Workers on farms in the supply chain; 
4. Farmers (small-scale) growing the  commodities; 
5. Land, both rights and access to land and sustainable use of it; 
6. Water, both rights and access to water resources and sustainable use of it; 
3Descriptions of domains are retrieved from the campaign website www.behindthebrands.org. 
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7. Climate, both relating to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and helping farmers adapt to 
climate change. 
 
Indicators are based on information retrieved from publicly available documents. For six of the 
seven domains (transparency excluded) they fall into the following four categories: 
 
1. Awareness: Does the company demonstrate general awareness of key issues relating to that 
theme and does it conduct projects to understand and address these key issues? 
2. Knowledge: Does the company demonstrate it measures, assesses and reports key issues 
and facts specifically in its supply chains that relate to that theme? 
3. Commitments: Does the company commit to addressing the key issues relating to that 
theme in its supply chains? 
4. Supply chain management: Does the company require its suppliers to meet relevant stan- 
dards related to that theme? 
 
The four categories have been defined to measure increasing engagement in social and environ- 
mental issues, from general awareness of a problem to the monitoring and enforcement of the 
supply chain’s conformity to high social and environmental standards. 
 
 
Information used to create indicators in the first (Transparency) domain is different from the 
above since it has a broader focus and involves disclosure on issues that may simultaneously 
involve several of the remaining six domains. 
 
 
An important aspect of the scores we use for our field experiment is that they focus on agricul- 
tural sourcing policies. That is, the scores represent a specific ‘downstream’ and limited domain 
of CSR that is therefore far from the self-interest or utility of consumers in relation to the final 
product. Moreover, the scores do not consider those ‘downstream’ domains of corporate responsi - 
bility such as corporate philanthropy, which can create benefits for workers or local communities 
in market places as well as encouraging environmental sustainability in the country of the final 
consumer. It is well-documented that concern and sensitivity for the wellbeing of foreigners and 
distant people decline significantly during negative business cycles as the economy tends to be 
considered a fixed cake (Becchetti, Castriota and Rossetti, 2009). Our analysis becomes even 
more relevant precisely because it is conducted at the end of a six-year recession which saw a fall 
of about 14 percent in average Italian household income (OECD, 2015). 
 
 
In the next sections we describe the design of our field experiment, present and discuss our de- 




3 Experiment design 
 
The experiment involves four stores of the biggest Italian grocery chain, Coop. The stores are 
located in the Tuscan towns of Firenze, Lucca, Pisa, and Siena. 
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We apply a two-group, two-phase crossover design (Jones and Kenward, 2003) and randomly 
assign each store to a group corresponding to the treatment-control or the control-treatment 
experimental sequences. The first phase started on 30th May, 2016 and was in place for 4 weeks, 
after which stores started a second 4-week phase that ended on 24th July, 2016. The experiment 
lasted 8 weeks in total. The two groups of stores share similar characteristics in terms of size, 
location, sales per square meter as well as a number of demographic variables such as average 
age, income, education level and percentage of foreigners living in each of the neighbourhoods 
(Table A.1 in Appendix A). 
 
 
During the first phase, the control period, there was no intervention regarding CSR, and neither 
the store employees nor the customers were aware that we were registering sales for the pur- 
poses of the experiment. In the second phase, the treatment period, we displayed a large poster 
(2mx1m) reporting the Oxfam ranking of the world’s ten largest food companies according to 
their performance in seven CSR domains. The poster was placed at the main entrance of each 
store and occupied part of the doorway so that it was visible to every customer entering that 
store. The poster was designed to hold a pocket containing fliers that reproduced the main poster 
in a smaller size, as well as providing full details of the Oxfam campaign and the associated web- 
site (Figure 2). Each store carried 1,000 fliers, of which less than 100 fliers were left at the end 
of the experiment. During the treatment phase, workers of each store did not know the details 
of the project and were instructed not to give any explanation to customers who would ask for 




4 Econometric analysis 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
To provide a summary view of our descriptive findings we report the weekly sales in the stores se- 
lected for our experiment at brand level. It is important to note that we use three levels:product, 
brand, company. For example, Coccolino is a brand of Unilever and Buitoni is one of the brands 
belonging to Nestlé). A single brand may have different products (i.e. Buitoni produces different 
types of biscuits and pasta). In Table 1 we show the brands for each company and the sales 
volume for each brand over the entire period of the experiment. Sales vary according to the 
number of different products sold for each brand for a given company (e.g., different types of 
Algida ice-creams under the Algida brand belonging to the Unilever company) and the availabil- 
ity of each product in the given supermarket place. As expected, Unilever and Nestlé have the 
highest number of brands. Other companies have much fewer brands sold in the shops where 
the experiment is held (Kellogg’s has two brands and ABF has one brand only, that is, Twinings 
tea). There are only nine companies involved in our Behind the Brands experiment and not 
ten because Coop supermarkets, where the experiment takes place, do not carry products for 
General Mills, one of the ranked companies in the Oxfam list. 
 
 
Table 2 displays average market shares at brand level for each company and total sales at com- 
pany level in the treatment and control periods. From this table we see that the top ranked 
company (Unilever) experiences a growth in sales of around 10 percent with the treatment and 
a similar 10 percent increase in average market share at company level. At the same time, total 
sales of companies ranked at the bottom tend to fall. In order to test whether these descriptive 
differences are significant we need to control for price effects, company/store specific fixed effects 
7  




4.2 Econometric specification and hypothesis  testing 
 
We test econometrically the effect of the publication of scores of the Behind the Brands campaign 
on the scorecard poster treatment by using the following specification 
 








α2cT reat ∗ Companyc + α3Pricep,c,s,t + ξt + ξcs + εp,c,s,t (1) 
where δp,c,s,t measures the market share of product p of company c at store s during week t, 
Companyc is a (0/1) dummy for the c-th company ranked in the Behind the Brands campaign 
if c ∈ BtB and non-ranked if c ∈ NR, where BtB is the set of the ten companies ranked in the 
Behind the Brands campaign and NR is the set of the six largest companies with products sold 
in the experiment supermarket branches that are not ranked in the Behind the Brands campaign; 
T reat is a dummy taking value one in the treatment period and zero otherwise; Pricep,c,s,t is 
the price for each product p of company c at store s during week t, ξt and ξis are (0/1) dummies 
picking up the week t and the cs-th company/store fixed effect, respectively. Among the controls, 
price levels capture the influence of brand products unit prices on brand product market shares. 
Week effects capture common factors affecting sales dynamics such as average weather conditions 
of the specific week (i.e., higher market shares of ice-creams if the temperature is higher) and any 
news that may affect consumers’ behaviour. Company/store fixed effects capture idiosyncratic 
time invariant components related to company-related consumption habits of the given shops 
and product characteristics. We use bootstrapped standard errors, a typical strategy adopted 
when the number of clusters is small 4. In addition, we replicate all our findings with multilevel 
mixed-effects estimates as is standard in cluster-specific information (Bauer and Sterba, 2011). 
In our data, stores represent level 1 and the weekly market shares of products represent level 2. 
 
 
Based on (1) our first null hypothesis is 






α1c = 0. 
 
The null implies the joint irrelevance of the treatment on treated companies. Its rejection implies 




Our second null hypothesis is 
H02 : 
, 
α2c  = 0. 
c NR 
 
The null implies the joint irrelevance of the treatment on non-treated companies having products 
sold in the shops where the experiment takes place. Its rejection implies that the treatment has 
4We follow the Davidson and MacKinnon (2000) A-procedure to calculate the optimal number of bootstrap 
replications, that is, we rely on their statistics calculating the optimal number of replications that makes the error 
between predicted and actual p-value small enough to be  acceptable. 
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significant effects on the average product market shares of non-ranked companies. 
 
 
An alternative specification used to test for the marginal effect of the total Behind the Brands 
score is 
 
δp,i,j,k = β0 + β1T otalScorec + β2T reat ∗ T otalScorec + ξk + ξb + εr,i,j,k (2) 
 
where T otalScorec is the total score for company c ranked in the Behind the Brands campaign 
(that is, for each c ∈ BtB) and the other regressors are defined as in (1).  The analysis here  is 
limited to products of companies ranked in the Behind the Brands campaign. 
Based on (2), we test the following null hypothesis 
H03 : β2 = 0. 
 
The null implies the irrelevance of the total score, while its rejection on the positive side implies 
that a unit increase in the Behind the Brands total score has a positive and significant effect on 




4.3 Econometric findings 
 
Our findings on the impact of CSR treatment in a sample including observations of weekly sales 
of all products sold in the treated supermarkets are presented in Table 3. In the first specification 
we test the treatment effect on the ten companies covered by the Behind the Brands Oxfam’s 
campaign (column 1), while in a second specification (column 2) we use the fully augmented 
specification in (1) and also introduce dummies capturing the effect of the treatment on the 
most relevant selected companies not included in the ranking (Coop, Barilla, Lavazza, Mukki, 
Sammontana and Ferrero). A first important finding is that the ranking matters since six out of 
the nine company dummies interacted with the treatment dummy are significant (the F–test on 
the joint significance of the T reat ∗ BtBCompany dummies is F(9 ; 156,493) = 741.60, Prob > 
F = 0.000, indicating rejection of the null hypothesis H01 in section 4.2) in the first specification 
controlling for prices, week effects and company/store fixed effects. The result remains significant 
when we introduce the non-ranked company treatment-interacted dummies (Non-BtB company 
variables in column 2). Columns 3 and 4 display the multilevel estimates and confirm the results 
for each company as well as for joint significance. 
 
 
In addition to this general result we have more specific findings. First, our treatment produces 
a 6 percent increase in the market share of the top ranked brand (Unilever). What is interesting 
as well is that the companies ranked second and third (Nestlé and Coca-Cola) experience in- 
significant changes in their market shares, while the impact on the 4th and 5th brands (Kellogg’s 
and Mars) becomes positive again. A tentative interpretation for these combined findings is the 
relatively more negative reputation of Nestlé and Coca-Cola at the international level and in 
Italy among those types of consumers who regularly shop at Coop supermarkets and who are in 
general more critical toward multinational companies. This negative reputation is likely to un- 
dermine and to invalidate the good news of their high rank in the Behind the Brands campaign.5 
Since we are unable to interact treatment with a sound variable measuring pre-Oxfam public 
5An indication of the relatively more negative perception of Coca Cola and Nestlé in the general public may be 
found in the existence of a specific Wikipedia item related to such criticism. On the item “criticism of Coca- 
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image (given the difficulty of creating such variable and the small number of varying observations 
it should have), the above mentioned interpretation is clearly an ex post interpretation and not 
a finding that comes out of an ex ante designed empirical test. Beyond the heterogeneity of 
impact described above, a rank in the top five of the Behind the Brands campaign has an overall 
positive and significant impact since the null of no impact is rejected on the positive side (F(5 ; 
156,493) = 674.64, Prob > F = 0.000). 
 
A third important finding is that our treatment produces negative effects on companies ranked 
between the 6th and the 9th (last) position (PepsiCo, Mondelez, and Danone)6 with the exception 
of ABF where the impact is surprisingly positive, even though not always strongly significant. 
We  argue that what may matter here is that, as shown in Table 1, ABF has only one brand    
on our supermarket shelves, Twinings tea, and this brand is not easily identifiable with ABF. 
Furthermore, Twinings has a strong ethical reputation among Italian and world consumers, made 
salient by our experiment that induces consumers to focus on corporate social and environmental 
responsibility.7 In spite of this exception, a ranking in the last four places of the Behind the 
Brands campaign produces a negative and significant effect since the null hypothesis of no impact 
is rejected on the negative side (F(4 ; 156,493) = 84.46, Prob > F = 0.000). 
 
Findings from the second specification (Table 3, column 2) confirm all the above results but 
provide additional evidence of a negative (even though small in magnitude) effect on companies 
not covered by the Behind the Brands campaign when we select the first six non-ranked compa- 
nies in terms of total sales in the selected supermarkets (Coop, Barilla, Lavazza, Sammontana, 
Mukki and Ferrero) (the joint significance test is F(6 ; 156,493) = 1786.44, Prob > F = 0.000). 
This effect is stronger with bootstrapped than with multilevel estimates. Hence our second null 
hypothesis (H02) on the irrelevance of the experiment for non-treated brands is rejected in the 
direction of a negative effect. This implies that the ‘invisibility effect’ generated by not being 
among the ranked companies works negatively. A likely interpretation is that the positive effect 
on top ranked companies can erode market shares of the excluded brands. Another rationale 
for the invisibility effect is that consumers reading the scoreboard may have been under the 
impression that the ranking is run on all companies and not just on the ten world largest food 
multinationals (in spite of our clarification in the attached fliers). If this is the case, then the 
ranking would also signal to consumers a low CSR quality of non-ranked companies. 
 
Cola” it is possible to find information about most of the negative corporate responsibility issues related to the 
company (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Coca-Cola). The Nestlé case is even more clear cut since 
the company suffered and is still suffering a word boycott campaign related to the aggressive marketing of breast 
milk substitutes, particularly in less economically developed countries (LEDCs), largely among the poor. The 
Wikipedia item “boycott Nestlé” dedicated to it can be retrieved at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nestl%C3% 
A9_boycott. Even though Wikipedia pages are not scientific proofs, the two explicitly negative Wikipedia pages 
related to the two companies are a clear-cut indication of their relatively stronger negative perception by the 
general public. And perception is what matters in our experiment. To compare this evidence with what concerns 
the top ranked Behind the Brands company it is impossible to find a Wikipedia voice on Unilever boycott or 
criticism of Unilever. Criticism on Coca-Cola and Nestlé is therefore expected to be widespread among the most 
socially aware consumers. 
6General Mills, Mondelez and Danone are the only three companies having at least one score of two (the 
minimum assigned by the campaign). 
7The Guardian discusses the disappointing CSR performance of ABF arguing that the company “does a 
disservice to the group because, in reality, it has some highly respected ethical enterprises among its portfolio. 
Twinings for instance has forged a solid reputation as a founder member of the Ethical Tea Partnership.” (https:// 
www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/associated-british-foods-transparent-nestle-coca-cola) Again this is 
an ex-post interpretation of our findings. This article clearly shows that the reputation of Twinings tea is different 
from that of ABF. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that Coop consumers do not easily reconnect the ABF score     
to the unique ABF brand (Twinings tea) sold in Coop supermarket and focus instead of the ethical strength of    
the latter that becomes more salient with the    experiment. 
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In interpreting our findings we must consider that rejection of the null is particularly remarkable 
given two offsetting factors that should go in the opposite direction. On the one hand, the shops 
where we perform our experiment are Coop supermarkets and therefore they are usually attended 
by a selected and socially motivated sample of consumers, most of whom are Coop shareholders. 
We therefore expect that these consumers may already be aware of some of the social and envi- 
ronmental concerns raised by the campaign and incorporate them in their pre-treatment choices. 
On the other hand the experiment is run in 2016, that is, after a severe recessionary spell that 
led Italian households to lose on average 14 percent of their per capita income after the 2008 
financial crisis (OECD, 2015). We can reasonably expect that the crisis may have made Italian 
consumers less sensitive to social and environmental issues and relatively more price sensitive 
than during positive business cycle periods. 
 
 
The information obtained with our treatment is much richer than just a ranking among the 
ten biggest world food companies, since we also have detailed 1–10 scale scores in the seven 
different domains covered by the campaign (Transparency, Women, Workers, Farmers, Land, 
Water, and Climate). We therefore test whether the absolute score values matter in a different 
specification where the company dummies disappear and we simply introduce a baseline total 
score variable (T otalScore) plus a total score variable interacted with the treatment dummy 
(T reat ∗ T otalScore) (see specification (2) in section 4.2). Note that in this case the number of 
observations is far lower since we exclude from the analysis the products of all non-ranked brands. 
 
 
Our findings show that both variables (baseline and treatment interacted total score) are signif- 
icant, which leads to the rejection of our third null hypothesis (H03) (Table 4). The significance 
of the baseline total score variable (T otalScore) may have three interpretations: i) it simply 
reflects that, for reasons unrelated to their CSR reputation, companies at the top of the ranking 
have higher market shares; ii) it captures a reverse causality effect between CSR and performance 
where top performers (assuming that market shares in our selected supermarkets coincide with 
aggregate world market shares) have more resources to dedicate to CSR;8 iii) it proves a direct 
causality effect where CSR has a positive impact on performance. An investigation of which of 
the three possible interpretations applies is, however, beyond the scope of the present research, 
which focuses only on the effect of the treatment. The significance of the total score variable 
interacted with the treatment dummy shows that the treatment (informing customers about the 
Behind the Brands scores) has positive and significant effects on sales. This finding confirms 
previous results on hypothesis one, by showing that drawing consumers’ attention to the Behind 




5 Robustness checks 
 
As a first robustness check we consider that a limit of the crossover design is that shops with 
a two-period treatment-control sequence may not be considered as ‘pure controls’ if the first 
period treatment effect has post treatment (second period) consequences. We therefore limit our 
estimate to the first two weeks hence eliminating this possibility (Table A.2). In a second check 
we add three pure control stores, that is stores where the treatment has never been performed 
(Table A.3). In both cases our main findings are confirmed. As a further robustness check we 
consider that it may be observed that prices should be excluded from the set of control variables. 
8Empirical evidence on a causality nexus going from corporate performance to CSR is provided by Hong, 
Kubik and Scheinkman  (2012). 
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We therefore perform an additional estimate excluding them from the set of regressors and find 
that our results remain robust (Table A.4). 
 
Another possible objection to our analysis is that the Behind the Brands campaign is focused on 
food, while the ten ranked companies also produce non-food products. We therefore disentangle 
the treatment effects on food and non-food products in an augmented specification (Table A.5). 
Our findings show that the treatment effect is concentrated on food products. Consumers thus 
correctly link their behaviour to the specific target of the Behind the Brands campaign, i.e. the 
international food product chain, while the reputation effects on non-food products of the same 
companies are not significant. 
 
 
Our four-week treatment phase may have a specific time pattern depending on the priming of 
the stimulus and on heterogeneity in the frequency of purchases related to each different product 
category. For this reason we repeat our estimates by: i) separately considering the first to the 
fourth week treatment effects (Table A.6); ii) estimating our specification at product category 
level (Table A.7) and iii) at brand level (Table A.8). Findings from week-specific additional esti- 
mates reveal that our main results are quite robust and do not exhibit particular time patterns 
during the treatment period. From our brand level estimates we see that the effect on the top 
ranked company (Unilever) is uniform across all brands. The same occurs for the negative effect 
on the bottom ranked company (Danone). Hence in this case brand loyalty does not seem to re- 
duce the treatment effect. A special case is Mondelez where the negative effect is concentrated on 
the Milka brand. Another interesting finding relates to PepsiCo. There are four PepsiCo brands 
sold in the shops but the negative effect is concentrated on the brand with the same name as the 
company (Pepsi), while it is absent on other brands where perception of the relationship between 
brand and company is weaker. (PepsiCo’s Gatorade brand was unaffected by the treatment). 
 
 
The product category level analysis shows that most of the significant effects are concentrated in 
the pastry category. A tentative interpretation of this finding is that competition among brands 
in terms of reputation tends to be stronger for these products since both top and bottom ranked 
companies (and also non-ranked companies) present items in this category. This result contrasts 
with dairy products that are sold by Danone, the bottom ranked company but not by Unilever, 
the top ranked company. In this case the absence of negative significance on Danone sales (in 
spite of the general negative effect of the treatment on Danone) can presumably be due to lack 
of substitution opportunities in the top ranked company. 
 
 
As a further check on the role of comparative ranking in our findings, we perform a more parsi- 
monious estimate using only two treatment variables for ranking above/below median and find 
that they are both strongly significant in the expected direction (Table A.9). 
 
We have argued that rejection of the null of H01 (and H03) may be related to other-regarding 
preferences. We however considered that two of the Behind the Brands domains (Climate and 
Transparency) may in principle also affect the utility of final consumers. We therefore replicate 
the estimates of Table 4 with total scores computed after excluding these two domains. Note 
that the ranking of the ten companies is slightly modified after this change (Table A.10). Re- 
sults from the specification using the modified total score do not change significantly and the 
treatment interacted total score variable remains positive and significant (Table A.11). 
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We further examine whether the treatment effect persists after the poster scorecard is removed.9 
We therefore introduce in specification (2) a post-treatment dummy equal to one in the last 
months of our experiment for the two supermarkets assigned to the treatment–control phase or- 
der. We find that the total score treatment effect remains significant and that the post-treatment 
effect is positive and significant as well, even though smaller in magnitude (Table A.12). 
 
 
In a final robustness check we show how the significance of our findings changes when clustering 
standard errors at different levels. Since the typical (weather, advertising campaign) shocks 
affecting sales are at product class level we consider our store/brand/week/product class level 
as a good alternative for delimiting within and between group variance. Our main results are 





By choosing to pursue corporate social and environmental responsibility, companies may con- 
tribute to the achievement of social and environmental goals. They may, however, be reluctant to 
follow this course of action due to the high costs and limited benefits of this choice. Provision of 
proper information on their responsibility scores could help to change this negative cost-benefit 
balance if it influences consumers’ choices in the right direction. In other words, companies may 
be persuaded to take on greater CSR if it means sales are higher for more responsible companies. 
In our paper we assess whether this is the case with a randomised field experiment where we test 
the salience of the Oxfam Behind the Brands campaign when this information is made available 
to consumers with a ‘school report-like’ scorecard poster showing comparative CSR scores of the 
ten largest world food companies at the entrance of a selected number of supermarkets. 
 
 
The findings of our experiment show that the null hypothesis of the joint insignificance of the 
poster effect on treated supermarket sales of the ranked companies is rejected. More specifically, 
the top ranked company experiences a six percent increase in its market share. Moreover, several 
other brands experience relative changes in market share depending on their rank. Those ranked 
at the bottom register, in general, a negative and significant effect on market share. We also 
show that an increase in the total score produces a positive and significant impact on market 
shares. The effect of the treatment is concentrated on food products, consistent with the target 
area of the Oxfam campaign. It is also quite remarkable that our results are obtained at the 
end of a six-year recession period in Italy, since we would have expected the adverse economic 
conditions during which our experiment was held to reduce the other for factors, apart from 
prices and economic convenience, in determining consumer  choices. 
 
The interpretation of our findings can be related to different strands of the literature and, more 
specifically, to those arguing for the existence of unconditional - or social context dependent - 
other-regarding preferences and to CSR as a signal of product quality (thus not implying other- 
regarding preferences). This is because our experimental setting changes neither the prices nor 
the choice set of consumers, and the Behind the Brands campaign domains are mostly related to 
corporate conduct along the supply chains on issues not directly concerning self-interest of final 
9We basically remove in this exercise the hypothesis of no-carry-over assumption and assume that consumers 
have memory of the past treatment also in the following control period in which the shelf poster is removed (in 
stores where the treatment phase comes before the control phase). Note however that the violation of the no carry-
over assumption would produce a downward bias in our findings, therefore making the observed significance of the 





A key policy implication of our experiment would be that social and environmental goals of the 
policymakers could in part be achieved without costs for the government budget, by just bringing 
consumers closer to the perfect information assumption of textbook economic models. This is 
because, when information on CSR is provided, a share of consumers modifies their choices 
by increasing (reducing) purchases of top (bottom) CSR brands. This goal can be achieved by 
providing information at consumer locations on comparative CSR scores of product brands. More 
specifically, the positive impact of social and environmental responsibility may be to increase CSR 
benefits on corporate economic performance thereby creating an incentive for its implementation 
at a corporate level. 
 
The issue of properly defining high/low standards of social and environmental responsibility 
obviously arises here. We did not address this in the paper as we were simply interested in 
measuring the effects of publicising the rankings based on the criteria already defined by Oxfam 
without discussing their merit. A caveat to the policy implication of our results is that our 
findings come from a small scale (time-space contingent) experiment limited in time. General 
equilibrium effects, the impact of information overload, and time persistence of the significance 
of the treatment, need to be carefully evaluated in the case of policy measures using similar 
treatments persistently over time and on a larger scale. The combination of policy implications 
given these issues necessitates further research in this direction. 
 
 
Some other issues emerge also from our analysis. The experimental findings include some appar- 
ently paradoxical results in the relation between the Behind the Brands ranking and the impact 
on sales. We interpret these results as related, in one case, to the difficulty of linking brands to 
parent companies and to the different reputation between companies and brands (the Twinings 
tea/ABF case), or, in the two other cases, to consumers’ a priori beliefs and the reputation of 
some companies (the Nestlé and Coca-Cola case). If this interpretation is correct, it would imply 
that the significance of policies based on the experiment treatment is mediated by consumers’ 
a priori and by their capacity of linking products to companies (the online Behind the Brands 
website allows you to do this but our scorecard poster does not). In addition, we remark that 
the slightly negative ‘invisibility’ effect related to the small market share loss of companies not 
present in the ranking may reduce the incentive of the supermarkets to follow the policy. 
 
 
As a general conclusion, our findings reveal that the effect of more widespread information on 
corporate reputation to the general public may be relevant. The need for high quality standards 
for such information in order to avoid the undesired effects of manipulation and post-truths on 
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Figures  and tables 
 
Figure 1: Scorecard of the Oxfam Behind the Brands campaign posted at supermarket entries in the field 
experiment  (in Italian). 
 
 
Meaning of the scores given by the Oxfam’s campaign: Good = 8–10; Fair = 6–7; Some progress = 4–5; Poor = 
2–3; Very poor = 0–1. 
 
 
Translation  into English 
 
Brand Land Women Farmers Workers Climate Transparency Water Total 
Unilever 7 6 8 8 9 7 7 52 
Neslé 8 5 7 6 8 7 7 48 
Cocal Cola 8 6 3 6 6 5 6 40 
Kellogg’s 5 6 5 3 8 5 5 37 
Mars 4 5 5 4 6 6 4 34 
PepsiCo 7 4 3 3 7 5 5 34 
Mondelez 4 6 4 4 5 4 2 29 
General Mills 2 3 3 3 6 5 6 28 
ABF 5 3 3 4 4 3 3 25 
Danone 2 2 3 3 6 5 4 25 
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Figure 2: Position of the Behind the Brand scorecard at supermarket’s entry. 
 
 
Table 1: Brands and sales of the companies ranked in the Oxfam Behind the Brands campaign (period 
30 May 2016 – 24 July 2016). 
 













Coccolino 5,968.43  Buitoni 72,091.91  
Algida 11,629.82  Mare Fresco 1,215.97  
Mentadent 23,255.7  Fruttolo 6,619.6  
Knorr 18,534.91  Nestlé 8,766.3  
Dove 20,393.57  Mio 7,935.93  
Svelto 10,655.51  Smarties 485.15  
Lysoform 11,859.99  Belte’ 2,499.96  
Fissan 2,701.98  Galak 332.2  
Badedas 1,480.82  Lc1 1,544.67  
Cif 6,380.24  Nesquik 8,255.79  
Clear 1,826.35  Vera 4,714.36  
Calve’ 15,804.62  Orzoro 2,768.43  
Lipton 3,905.1  Nescafe’ 27,521.21  
Axe 479.69  Baci 3,190.74  
Carte D’or 20,908.72  Fruit Joy 225.33  
Sunsilk 6,557.11  Kit Kat 824.59  
Glysolid 722.77  Lion 183.06  
Cornetto 38,310.34  Maggi 602.25  
Magnum 45,283.13  Nidina 754.73  
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Zendium 3,827.79  Polo 416.95  
   Perugina 9,459.12 
Coca Cola 132,422.58 1.85 Bacetti Perugina 509.81 
Fanta 16,780.97    
Coca Cola 104,325.6  Kellogg’s 57,575.86 0.81 
Powerade 3,066.19  Pringles 9,036.04  
Sprite 3,901.74  Kellogg’s 48,539.82  
Burn 1,636.82     
Lilia 2,711.26  PepsiCo 12,475.63 0.17 
   Pepsi 5,433.78  
Mars 47,797.96 0.67 Gatorade 3,211.82  
Uncle Ben’s 18.88  Seven Up 149.52  
M&M’s 1,045.64  Lay’s 3,680.51  
Kitekat 6,281.5     
Pedigree 6,138.97  Mondelez 121,422.47 1.70 
Suzi Wan 261.75  Kraft 1,594.42  
Bounty 3,413.46  Saiwa 3,723.72  
Cesar 5,111.01  Philadelphia 40,241.63  
Mars 2,813.54  Milka 6,907.68  
Sheba 8,466.17  Toblerone 159.68  
Snickers 244.77  Oro Saiwa 26,763.22  
Twix 476.85  Ritz 852.67  
Whiskas 11,679.75  Tuc 6,685.98  
Perfect Fit 1,160.92  Figaro 497.29  
Catisfaction 684.75  Halls 955  
   Nabisco Oreo 1,962.7  
ABF 8,245.3 0.12 Sottilette 28,617.26  
Twinings 8,245.3  Mikado 2,461.22  
Danone 104,671.74 1.47 Coop 1,419,099.14 19.88 
Danone 6,892.68  Crescendo 53,022.9  
Actimel 14,684.68  Fior Fiore 165,096.3  
Activia 41,973.67  Solidal 19,305.49  
Danette 3,198.79  Coop. 904,300.9  
Vitasnella 14,193.72  Club 4-10 872.23  
Danacol 16,210.99  Vivi Verde 107,480.5  
Vitasnella Danone 7,517.21  Bene Si 69,207.07  
   Origine 48,171.96  
Barilla 181,268.61 2.54 Amici Speciali 43,090.92  
Barilla 1,109.3  Amici Speciali Premium 8,550.87  
Mulino Bianco 141,240.6     
Pavesi 36,187.14  Ferrero 103,917.28 1.46 
Wasa 2,731.57  Ferrero 5,037.04  
   Kinder 40,380.87  
Sammontana 100,321.6 1.41 Estathé 50,873.34  
   Tic Tac 4,953.19  







Duplo 1,041.82  
Total    2,978,415.49 41.72 
* Percent of sales on total sales in the shopping places selected for the experiment. 
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Table 2: Weekly average market shares and weekly total sales at product level for the Oxfam-ranked 
companies. 
 
Control period Treatment period 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Unilever           
Market share 2,696 0.033 0.002 0.030 0.039 2,675 0.036 0.006 0.028 0.048 
Total sales 2,696 44,642 77,451 0.000 1109,920 2,675 48,647 104,683 0.000 1479,580 
Nestlé           
Market share 2,388 0.022 0.003 0.016 0.025 2,428 0.023 0.004 0.016 0.030 
Total sales 2,388 34,319 61,205 0.000 682,400 2,428 32,523 56,893 0.000 753,100 
Coca Cola           
Market share 396 0.019 0.005 0.011 0.027 394 0.018 0.003 0.014 0,023 
Total sales 396 168,348 307,692 0,360 1801,380 394 166,895 323,098 1,250 2235,200 
Kellogg’s           
Market share 466 0.008 0.001 0.006 0.010 466 0.008 0.001 0.007 0.010 
Total sales 466 62,885 79,885 1,400 709,390 466 60,668 75,929 2,080 544,520 
Mars           
Market share 833 0.007 0.002 0.004 0.010 892 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.010 
Total sales 833 27,810 29,666 0,940 252,330 892 27,611 28,866 1,050 219,210 
PepsiCo           
Market share 196 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003 198 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.003 
Total sales 196 33,152 25,603 3,710 127,670 198 30,191 28,282 0,800 167,130 
Mondelez           
Market share 1,007 0.017 0.001 0.015 0.020 1,009 0.017 0.001 0.015 0.019 
Total sales 1,007 61,496 141,056 0,950 1025,260 1,009 59,392 141,745 0.950 1717,690 
ABF           
Market share 112 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 118 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 
Total sales 112 37,361 33,875 2,500 165,700 118 34,414 27,714 2,500 128,800 
Danone           
Market share 631 0.014 0.002 0.011 0.017 618 0.013 0.002 0.010 0.016 
Total sales 631 79,657 144,751 0,530 1169,660 618 76,886 133,332 0,530 1298,720 
 
 

















Unilever*Treat  [1st, 52] 0.0614*** 0.0614*** 0.0614*** 0.0614*** 
 (0.00298) (0.00302) (0.00105) (0.00105) 
Nestlé*Treat [2nd, 48] -0.00120 -0.00120 -0.00120 -0.00120 
 (0.00345) (0.00354) (0.00111) (0.00111) 
Coca Cola*Treat [3rd, 40] -0.00323 -0.00323 -0.00323 -0.00323 
 (0.0122) (0.0117) (0.00267) (0.00267) 
Kellogg’s*Treat  [4th, 37] 0.0180** 0.0180** 0.0180*** 0.0180*** 
 (0.00718) (0.00731) (0.00247) (0.00247) 
Mars*Treat [5th, 34] 0.0783*** 0.0783*** 0.0783*** 0.0783*** 
 (0.00514) (0.00546) (0.00181) (0.00181) 
PepsiCo*Treat  [6th, 34] -0.0710** -0.0710** -0.0710*** -0.0710*** 
 (0.0312) (0.0308) (0.00375) (0.00375) 
Mondelez*Treat [7th, 29] -0.00777*** -0.00777*** -0.00777*** -0.00777*** 
 (0.00263) (0.00262) (0.00169) (0.00169) 
ABF*Treat [9th, 25] 0.0323** 0.0323** 0.0323*** 0.0323*** 
 (0.0147) (0.0154) (0.00482) (0.00482) 
Danone*Treat  [10th, 25] -0.0219*** -0.0219*** -0.0219*** -0.0219*** 
 (0.00276) (0.00303) (0.00198) (0.00198) 




Barilla*Treat  -0.00138***  -0.00138 
  (9.32e
−05)  (0.00115) 























(1) and (2) show OLS with bootstrapped standard errors with 491 replications in parentheses; (3) and (4) show 
multilevel estimates. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 

























Totalscore 0.0497*** 0.0509*** 0.0497*** 0.0509*** 
 (0.000519) (0.000963) (0.000453) (0.00200) 
Company/Store FE No Yes No Yes 
Store FE Yes No Yes No 
Week FE Yes Yes Yes  
Price Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,287 16,287 16,287 16,287 
No. of groups   4 4 
R-squared 0.449 0.977   
(1) and (2) show OLS with bootstrapped standard errors with 491 replications in paren- 
theses; (3) and (4) show multilevel  estimates. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 (0.000203)  (0.00201) 
Mukki*Treat  -0.00126***  -0.00126 
  (0.000124)  (0.00143) 
Sammontana*Treat  -0.00128***  -0.00128 
  (0.000196)  (0.00219) 
Ferrero*Treat  -0.00137***  -0.00137 
  (0.000129)  (0.00147) 
Price Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Company/Store FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Joint significance of     
ranked brands F(9 ; 156,493) 741.60 (0.000) 685.38 (0.000) 5899.83 (0.000) 5900.61 (0.000) 
non-ranked brands F(6 ; 156,493)  1786.44 (0.000)  18.13 (0.006) 
top 5 ranked brands F(5 ; 156,493) 674.64 (0.000) 635.04 (0.000) 5352.73 (0.000) 5353.44 (0.000) 
bottom 4 ranked brands F(4 ; 156,493) 84.46 (0.000) 68.34 (0.000) 547.10 (0.000) 547.18(0.000) 
No. of groups   4 4 
Observations 156,493 156,493 156,493 156,493 
R-squared 
Likelihood ratio test vs.  linear model χ̄2 
0.99 0.99 





A Appendix.  Additional tables. 
 
Table A.1: Store randomisation with respect to store and neighbourhood characteristics. 
 
 Group 1 Group 2 
Total Sales/mq 16,839.78 14,014.04 
Age 57.9 57.8 
Education 76.8 70.7 
Foreigners 11.10 12.55 
Income 129.04 115.20 
Group 1 includes stores assigned to Control–Treatment 
phases order and Group 2 includes stores assigned to 
Treatment–Control phase order. Total Sales/mq refers 
to store total sales per squared meter in the year be- 
fore the experiment, i.e. 2015; Age refers to the average 
age of people living in the store neighbourhood; Educa- 
tion refers to the percentage of people with a high school 
diploma living in the store neighbourhood; Foreigners 
refers to the percentage of non-Italian people living in 
the store neighborhood; Income refers to the household 
income of households living in the store neighbourhoods, 
where 100 is the average income of all households poten- 
tially supplied by Coop in Tuscany, Italy. 
 
 


















Unilever*Treat 0.0553*** 0.0553*** 0.0553*** 0.0553*** 
 (0.00562) (0.00522) (0.00172) (0.00172) 
Nestlé*Treat 0.0178*** 0.0178*** 0.0178*** 0.0178*** 
 (0.00591) (0.00561) (0.00179) (0.00179) 
Coca Cola*Treat 0.0183 0.0183 0.0183*** 0.0183*** 
 (0.0233) (0.0233) (0.00442) (0.00442) 
Kellogg’s*Treat 0.0230*** 0.0230*** 0.0230*** 0.0230*** 
 (0.00722) (0.00630) (0.00404) (0.00404) 
Mars*Treat 0.0854*** 0.0854*** 0.0854*** 0.0854*** 
 (0.00794) (0.00797) (0.00295) (0.00295) 
PepsiCo*Treat -0.00424 -0.00424 -0.00424 -0.00424 
 (0.0532) (0.0517) (0.00601) (0.00601) 
Mondelez*Treat -0.0242*** -0.0242*** -0.0242*** -0.0242*** 
 (0.00271) (0.00222) (0.00273) (0.00273) 
ABF*Treat 0.0141 0.0141 0.0141* 0.0141* 
 (0.0232) (0.0222) (0.00782) (0.00782) 
Danone*Treat -0.0382*** -0.0382*** -0.0382*** -0.0382*** 
 (0.00306) (0.00305) (0.00321) (0.00321) 




Barilla*Treat  -0.00135***  -0.00135 
  (0.000157)  (0.00189) 
Lavazza*Treat  -0.00185***  -0.00185 
  (0.000292)  (0.00329) 
Mukki*Treat  -0.00132***  -0.00132 
  (0.000189)  (0.00234) 
Sammontana*Treat  -0.00150***  -0.00150 
  (0.000281)  (0.00363) 
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Company/Store FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Joint significance of 









non-ranked brands F(6 ; 78,590)  929.22 (0.000)  7.56 (0.272) 
top 5 ranked brands F(5 ; 78,590) 244.44 (0.000) 244.52 (0.000) 2021.59 (0.000) 2021.76 (0.000) 
bottom 4 ranked brands F(4 ; 78,590) 234.73 (0.000) 225.44 (0.000) 223.83 (0.000) 223.85 (0.000) 
No. of groups   4 4 
Observations 78,590 78,590 78,590 78,590 
R-squared 0.99 0.99   
(1) and (2) show OLS with bootstrapped standard errors with 491 replications in parentheses; (3) and (4) show 
multilevel estimates. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 




























 (0.00308) (0.00318) (0.00105) (0.00105) 
Nestlé*Treat -0.00192 -0.00192 -0.00192* -0.00192* 
 (0.00354) (0.00346) (0.00111) (0.00111) 
Coca Cola*Treat -0.00396 -0.00396 -0.00396 -0.00396 
 (0.0116) (0.0117) (0.00266) (0.00266) 
Kellogg’s*Treat 0.0173** 0.0173** 0.0173*** 0.0173*** 
 (0.00770) (0.00710) (0.00246) (0.00246) 
Mars*Treat 0.0775*** 0.0775*** 0.0775*** 0.0775*** 
 (0.00520) (0.00551) (0.00181) (0.00181) 
PepsiCo*Treat -0.0716** -0.0716** -0.0716*** -0.0716*** 
 (0.0303) (0.0306) (0.00374) (0.00374) 
Mondelez*Treat -0.00838*** -0.00838*** -0.00838*** -0.00838*** 
 (0.00251) (0.00252) (0.00169) (0.00169) 
ABF*Treat 0.0316** 0.0316** 0.0316*** 0.0316*** 
 (0.0156) (0.0153) (0.00481) (0.00481) 
Danone*Treat -0.0226*** -0.0226*** -0.0226*** -0.0226*** 
 (0.00309) (0.00295) (0.00198) (0.00198) 




Barilla*Treat  -0.00131***  -0.00131 
  (1.00e
−05)  (0.00115) 
Lavazza*Treat  -0.00151***  -0.00151 
  (0.000191)  (0.00200) 
Mukki*Treat  -0.00119***  -0.00119 
  (0.000119)  (0.00143) 
Sammontana*Treat  -0.00121***  -0.00121 
  (0.000175)  (0.00219) 
Ferrero*Treat  -0.00130***  -0.00130 
  (0.000127)  (0.00147) 
Price Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Company/Store FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Joint significance of     
ranked brands F(9 ; 272,265) 671.04 (0.000) 575.54 (0.000) 5815.21 (0.000) 5815.63 (0.000) 
non-ranked brands F(6 ; 272,265)  1629.30 (0.000)  16.84 (0.009) 
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top 5 ranked brands F(5 ; 272,265) 399.93 (0.000) 366.50 (0.000) 3416.29 (0.000) 3416.51 (0.000) 
bottom 4 ranked brands F(4 ; 272,265) 273.04 (0.000) 277.15 (0.000) 2398.92 (0.000) 2399.12 (0.000) 
No. of groups   7 7 
Observations 272,265 272,265 272,265 272,265 
R-squared 0.99 0.99   
(1) and (2) show OLS with bootstrapped standard errors with 491 replications in parentheses; (3) and (4) show 
multilevel estimates. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 


















Unilever*Treat  [1st, 52] 0.0609*** 0.0609*** 0.0609*** 0.0609*** 
 (0.00292) (0.00291) (0.00101) (0.00101) 
Nestlé*Treat [2nd, 48] 0.000753 0.000753 0.000753 0.000753 
 (0.00336) (0.00349) (0.00106) (0.00106) 
Coca Cola*Treat [3rd, 40] -0.00468 -0.00468 -0.00468* -0.00468* 
 (0.0112) (0.0110) (0.00262) (0.00262) 
Kellogg’s*Treat  [4th, 37] 0.0182*** 0.0182** 0.0182*** 0.0182*** 
 (0.00678) (0.00699) (0.00242) (0.00242) 
Mars*Treat [5th, 34] 0.0777*** 0.0777*** 0.0777*** 0.0777*** 
 (0.00525) (0.00544) (0.00178) (0.00178) 
PepsiCo*Treat  [6th, 34] -0.0742** -0.0742** -0.0742*** -0.0742*** 
 (0.0304) (0.0304) (0.00371) (0.00371) 
Mondelez*Treat [7th, 29] -0.00750*** -0.00750*** -0.00750*** -0.00750*** 
 (0.00230) (0.00251) (0.00165) (0.00164) 
ABF*Treat [9th, 25] 0.0323** 0.0323** 0.0323*** 0.0323*** 
 (0.0156) (0.0154) (0.00486) (0.00486) 
Danone*Treat  [10th, 25] -0.0209*** -0.0209*** -0.0209*** -0.0209*** 
 (0.00310) (0.00293) (0.00195) (0.00195) 




Barilla*Treat  -0.00138***  -0.00138 
  (9.78e
−05)  (0.00114) 
Lavazza*Treat  -0.00147***  -0.00147 
  (0.000147)  (0.00195) 
Mukki*Treat  -0.00130***  -0.00130 
  (0.000120)  (0.00144) 
Sammontana*Treat  -0.00134***  -0.00134 
  (0.000171)  (0.00204) 
Ferrero*Treat  -0.00137***  -0.00137 
  (0.000127)  (0.00147) 
Company/Store FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Joint significance of     
ranked brands F(9 ; 166,591) 705.45 (0.000) 713.26 (0.000) 6215.66 (0.000) 6216.38 (0.000) 
non-ranked brands F(6 ; 166,591)  2473.18 (0.000)  19.09 (0.004) 
top 5 ranked brands F(5 ; 166,591) 640.73 (0.000) 633.71 (0.000) 5637.33 (0.000) 5637.98 (0.000) 
bottom 4 ranked brands F(4 ; 166,591) 66.49 (0.000) 71.50 (0.000) 578.34 (0.000) 578.41 (0.000) 
No. of groups   4 4 
Observations 166,591 166,591 166,591 166,591 
R-squared 0.99 0.99   
(1) and (2) show OLS with bootstrapped standard errors with 491 replications in parentheses; (3) and (4) show 
multilevel estimates. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
24  
Table A.5: The effect of the Behind the Brands scorecard poster on companies’ market shares. (controlling 

















Unilever*Treat 0.0598*** 0.0598*** 0.0598*** 0.0598*** 
 (0.00398) (0.00399) (0.00131) (0.00131) 
Nestlé*Treat -0.00120 -0.00120 -0.00120 -0.00120 
 (0.00376) (0.00366) (0.00111) (0.00111) 
Coca Cola*Treat -0.00323 -0.00323 -0.00323 -0.00323 
 (0.0123) (0.0126) (0.00267) (0.00267) 
Kellogg’s*Treat 0.0180** 0.0180** 0.0180*** 0.0180*** 
 (0.00735) (0.00732) (0.00247) (0.00247) 
Mars*Treat 0.0830*** 0.0829*** 0.0830*** 0.0829*** 
 (0.00899) (0.00879) (0.00291) (0.00291) 
PepsiCo*Treat -0.0710** -0.0710** -0.0710*** -0.0710*** 
 (0.0306) (0.0318) (0.00375) (0.00375) 
Mondelez*Treat -0.00738*** -0.00739*** -0.00738*** -0.00739*** 
 (0.00255) (0.00248) (0.00171) (0.00171) 
ABF*Treat 0.0323** 0.0323** 0.0323*** 0.0323*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0156) (0.00482) (0.00482) 
Danone*Treat -0.0219*** -0.0219*** -0.0219*** -0.0219*** 
 (0.00298) (0.00305) (0.00198) (0.00198) 




Barilla*Treat  -0.00143***  -0.00143 
  (9.96e−05)  (0.00115) 
Lavazza*Treat  -0.00163***  -0.00163 
  (0.000200)  (0.00201) 
Mukki*Treat  -0.00131***  -0.00131 
  (0.000134)  (0.00143) 
Sammontana*Treat  -0.00134***  -0.00134 
  (0.000200)  (0.00219) 
Ferrero*Treat  -0.00142***  -0.00142 
  (0.000124)  (0.00147) 
Non-food -8.48e−05 -0.000159 -8.48e−05 -0.000159 
 (9.72e−05) (0.000115) (0.000208) (0.000218) 
Unilever*Non-food*Treat 0.00293 0.00301 0.00293* 0.00301** 
 (0.00448) (0.00456) (0.00150) (0.00150) 
Mars*Non-food*Treat -0.00612 -0.00606 -0.00612** -0.00606** 
 (0.00953) (0.00912) (0.00298) (0.00298) 
Mondelez*Non-food*Treat -0.00768 -0.00761 -0.00768 -0.00761 
 (0.00857) (0.00861) (0.00547) (0.00547) 
Coop*Non-food  0.000241**  0.000241 
  (0.000130)  (0.000779) 
Price Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Company/Store FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Joint significance of     
ranked brands F(9 ; 156,493) 369.73 (0.000) 391.86 (0.000) 3489.51 (0.000) 3483.32 (0.000) 
non-ranked brands F(6 ; 156,493)  834.23 (0.000)  15.26 (0.018) 
top 5 ranked brands F(5 ; 156,493) 236.55 (0.000) 231.80 (0.000) 2143.72 (0.000) 2139.70 (0.000) 
bottom 4 ranked brands F(4 ; 156,493) 139.80 (0.000) 151.43 (0.000) 1357.82 (0.000) 1356.77 (0.000) 
No. of groups   4 4 
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Observations 156,493 156,493 156,493 156,493 
R-squared 0.99 0.99   
(1) and (2) show OLS with bootstrapped standard errors with 491 replications in parentheses; (3) and (4) show 
multilevel estimates. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 



















    
Week  1  [Reference] 0.0237*** 0.0237*** 0.0237*** 0.0237*** 
 (0.00538) (0.00511) (0.00162) (0.00162) 
Week 2 0.0768*** 0.0767*** 0.0768*** 0.0767*** 
 (0.00750) (0.00746) (0.00207) (0.00207) 
Week 3 0.0325*** 0.0325*** 0.0325*** 0.0325*** 
 (0.00589) (0.00557) (0.00204) (0.00205) 
Week 4 0.0427*** 0.0428*** 0.0427*** 0.0428*** 
 (0.00562) (0.00512) (0.00205) (0.00205) 
Nestlé*Treat     
Week  1  [Reference] 0.0299*** 0.0299*** 0.0299*** 0.0299*** 
 (0.00540) (0.00496) (0.00169) (0.00169) 
Week 2 -0.0138 -0.0139 -0.0138*** -0.0139*** 
 (0.00960) (0.00893)  (0.00214) 
Week 3 -0.0276*** -0.0276*** -0.0276*** -0.0276*** 
 (0.00509) (0.00481) (0.00214) (0.00214) 
Week 4 -0.0862*** -0.0862*** -0.0862*** -0.0862*** 
 (0.00519) (0.00495) (0.00217) (0.00217) 
Coca Cola*Treat     
Week  1  [Reference] -0.0435* -0.0435* -0.0435*** -0.0435*** 
 (0.0251) (0.0255) (0.00410) (0.00410) 
Week 2 0.0722** 0.0721** 0.0722*** 0.0721*** 
 (0.0321) (0.0313) (0.00524) (0.00524) 
Week 3 0.0218 0.0218 0.0218*** 0.0218*** 
 (0.0254) (0.0253) (0.00517) (0.00517) 
Week 4 0.0681*** 0.0682*** 0.0681*** 0.0682*** 
 (0.0240) (0.0245) (0.00516) (0.00516) 
Kellogg’s*Treat     
Week  1  [Reference] 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.118*** 
 (0.00924) (0.00879) (0.00379) (0.00379) 
Week 2 -0.0845*** -0.0846*** -0.0845*** -0.0846*** 
 (0.00975) (0.00908) (0.00482) (0.00482) 
Week 3 -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.111*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.00476) (0.00476) 
Week 4 -0.206*** -0.206*** -0.206*** -0.206*** 
 (0.0111) (0.0102) (0.00482) (0.00482) 
Mars*Treat     
Week  1  [Reference] 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 
 (0.00544) (0.00497) (0.00275) (0.00275) 
Week 2 -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.115*** 
 (0.00872) (0.00861) (0.00346) (0.00346) 
Week 3 -0.0596*** -0.0596*** -0.0596*** -0.0596*** 
 (0.00793) (0.00755) (0.00347) (0.00347) 
Week 4 0.00963 0.00971 0.00963*** 0.00971*** 
 (0.00895) (0.00895) (0.00347) (0.00347) 
PepsiCo*Treat     
Week  1  [Reference] -0.162** -0.162** -0.162*** -0.162*** 
 (0.0654) (0.0692) (0.00565) (0.00565) 
Week 2 0.128 0.128 0.128*** 0.128*** 
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 (0.0781) (0.0805) (0.00714) (0.00714) 
Week 3 0.181*** 0.181*** 0.181*** 0.181*** 
 (0.0665) (0.0703) (0.00718) (0.00718) 
Week 4 0.0547 0.0548 0.0547*** 0.0548*** 
 (0.0768) (0.0776) (0.00735) (0.00735) 
Mondelez*Treat     
Week  1  [Reference] 0.0269*** 0.0269*** 0.0269*** 0.0269*** 
 (0.00279) (0.00291) (0.00256) (0.00256) 
Week 2 -0.0475*** -0.0476*** -0.0475*** -0.0476*** 
 (0.00380) (0.00407) (0.00323) (0.00323) 
Week 3 -0.0119*** -0.0119*** -0.0119*** -0.0119*** 
 (0.00389) (0.00399) (0.00325) (0.00325) 
Week 4 -0.0831*** -0.0830*** -0.0831*** -0.0830*** 
 (0.00333) (0.00334) (0.00330) (0.00330) 
ABF*Treat     
Week  1  [Reference] 0.0324 0.0324 0.0324*** 0.0324*** 
 (0.0281) (0.0255) (0.00730) (0.00730) 
Week 2 0.0122 0.0121 0.0122 0.0121 
 (0.0312) (0.0318) (0.00918) (0.00918) 
Week 3 0.0592** 0.0592** 0.0592*** 0.0592*** 
 (0.0266) (0.0253) (0.00925) (0.00925) 
Week 4 -0.0723*** -0.0722*** -0.0723*** -0.0722*** 
 (0.0251) (0.0245) (0.00925) (0.00925) 
Danone*Treat     
Week  1  [Reference] -0.0280*** -0.0280*** -0.0280*** -0.0280*** 
 (0.00389) (0.00396) (0.00303) (0.00303) 
Week 2 0.0381*** 0.0380*** 0.0381*** 0.0380*** 
 (0.00361) (0.00356) (0.00386) (0.00386) 
Week 3 0.00639 0.00641 0.00639* 0.00641* 
 (0.00572) (0.00538) (0.00384) (0.00384) 
Week 4 -0.0208*** -0.0207*** -0.0208*** -0.0207*** 
 (0.00470) (0.00502) (0.00389) (0.00389) 
Coop     
Week  1  [Reference]  -0.00141***  -0.00141** 
  (0.000196)  (0.000688) 
Week 2  -0.000960***  -0.000960 
  (0.000322)  (0.000978) 
Week 3  0.000188  0.000188 
  (0.000258)  (0.000969) 
Week 4  0.000836***  0.000836 
  (0.000263)  (0.000968) 
Barilla     
Week  1  [Reference]  -0.00131***  -0.00131 
  (0.000390)  (0.00222) 







  (0.000349)  (0.00314) 
Week 4  0.000652**  0.000652 
  (0.000325)  (0.00316) 
Lavazza     
Week  1  [Reference]  -0.00172***  -0.00172 
  (0.000361)  (0.00388) 
Week 2  -0.000947*  -0.000947 
  (0.000515)  (0.00552) 
Week 3  0.000422  0.000422 
  (0.000516)  (0.00545) 
Week 4  0.00121***  0.00121 
  (0.000443)  (0.00552) 
Mukky     
Week  1  [Reference]  -0.00132***  -0.00132 
  (0.000287)  (0.00278) 
Week 2  -0.000885**  -0.000885 
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 (0.000407)  (0.00392) 
Week 3  0.000261  0.000261 
  (0.000397)  (0.00396) 
Week 4  0.000831**  0.000831 
 
Sammontana 
 (0.000350)  (0.00393) 
Week  1  [Reference]  -0.00149***  -0.00149 
  (0.000389)  (0.00425) 
Week 2  -0.000837  -0.000837 
  (0.000547)  (0.00610) 
Week 3  0.000429  0.000429 
  (0.000559)  (0.00597) 
Week 4  0.00111**  0.00111 
 
Ferrero 
 (0.000481)  (0.00599) 
Week  1  [Reference]  -0.00133***  -0.00133 
  (0.000280)  (0.00281) 
Week 2  -0.000881**  -0.000881 
  (0.000425)  (0.00397) 
Week 3  0.000132  0.000132 
  (0.000408)  (0.00403) 











Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Price Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 156,493 156,493 156,493 156,493 
R-squared 
Number of groups 




(1) and (2) show OLS with bootstrapped standard errors with 491 replications in paren- 
theses; (3) and (4) show multilevel  estimates. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 



















    
Pastry [Reference] 0.0459*** 0.0458*** 0.0459*** 0.0458*** 
 (0.00641) (0.00633) (0.00215) (0.00216) 
Baby items 0.0485*** 0.0485*** 0.0485*** 0.0485*** 
 (0.0145) (0.0150) (0.00538) (0.00539) 
Hot beverages 0.0139 0.0138 0.0139*** 0.0138*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0112) (0.00366) (0.00366) 
Prepared  food 0.0209** 0.0210** 0.0209*** 0.0210*** 
 (0.0100) (0.00980) (0.00354) (0.00355) 
Jarred goods 0.0207*** 0.0207** 0.0207*** 0.0207*** 
 (0.00794) (0.00816) (0.00264) (0.00265) 
Cleaners 0.0109 0.0110 0.0109*** 0.0110*** 
 (0.00806) (0.00800) (0.00274) (0.00275) 
Personal care 0.0178** 0.0179** 0.0178*** 0.0179*** 
 (0.00748) (0.00725) (0.00241) (0.00242) 
Paramedic products 0.0161 0.0160 0.0161** 0.0160** 
 (0.0224) (0.0202) (0.00680) (0.00681) 
Nestlé*Treat     
Pastry [Reference] 0.00116 0.00117 0.00116 0.00117 
 (0.00454) (0.00420) (0.00137) (0.00137) 
Bread  and bakery -0.0118 -0.0118 -0.0118*** -0.0118*** 
 (0.00758) (0.00732) (0.00235) (0.00235) 
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Baby items 0.0177 0.0177 0.0177*** 0.0177*** 
 (0.0135) (0.0124) (0.00445) (0.00446) 
Hot beverages -0.00433 -0.00436 -0.00433 -0.00436 
 (0.0139) (0.0133) (0.00418) (0.00419) 
Prepared  food 0.0319 0.0320 0.0319*** 0.0320*** 
 (0.0220) (0.0225) (0.00762) (0.00762) 
Jarred goods -0.00152 -0.00146 -0.00152 -0.00146 
 (0.0120) (0.0123) (0.00370) (0.00370) 
Cold drinks 0.0121 0.0121 0.0121** 0.0121** 
 (0.0168) (0.0164) (0.00503) (0.00503) 
Frozen foods -0.00309 -0.00324 -0.00309 -0.00324 
 (0.0104) (0.0102) (0.00342) (0.00343) 
Dairy -0.00895 -0.00892 -0.00895*** -0.00892*** 
 (0.00783) (0.00797) (0.00248) (0.00249) 
Fresh pasta -0.0161 -0.0161 -0.0161*** -0.0161*** 
 (0.0141) (0.0144) (0.00574) (0.00574) 
Coca Cola*Treat     
Cold drinks -0.00323 -0.00323 -0.00323 -0.00323 
 (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.00266) (0.00266) 
Kellogg’s*Treat     
Pastry [Reference] 0.0202*** 0.0202*** 0.0202*** 0.0202*** 
 (0.00743) (0.00776) (0.00255) (0.00255) 
Bread  and bakery -0.0189 -0.0189 -0.0189*** -0.0189*** 
 (0.0144) (0.0154) (0.00541) (0.00541) 
Mars*Treat     
Pastry [Reference] 0.0778*** 0.0778*** 0.0778*** 0.0778*** 
 (0.00871) (0.00938) (0.00300) (0.00300) 
Foreign food 0.0888*** 0.0889*** 0.0888*** 0.0889*** 
 (0.00969) (0.0107) (0.0115) (0.0115) 
Pet items 0.000840 -0.000796 -0.000840 -0.000796 
 (0.00919) (0.00994) (0.00308) (0.00309) 
PepsiCo*Treat     
Cold drinks  [Reference] -0.0662* -0.0662* -0.0662*** -0.0662*** 
 (0.0341) (0.0348) (0.00411) (0.00411) 
Bread  and bakery -0.0162 -0.0163 -0.0162*** -0.0163*** 
 (0.0529) (0.0506) (0.00583) (0.00583) 
Mondelez*Treat     
Pastry [Reference] -0.00710** -0.00711** -0.00710*** -0.00711*** 
 (0.00292) (0.00285) (0.00194) (0.00194) 
Bread  and bakery 0.000760 0.000725 0.000760 0.000725 
 (0.00610) (0.00657) (0.00415) (0.00416) 
Jarred goods 0.00136 0.00143 0.00136 0.00143 
 (0.00910) (0.00903) (0.00599) (0.00599) 
Personal care -0.00795 -0.00786 -0.00795 -0.00786 
 (0.00838) (0.00856) (0.00555) (0.00555) 
Dairy -0.00202 -0.00198 -0.00202 -0.00198 
 (0.00467) (0.00460) (0.00308) (0.00308) 
ABF*Treat     
Hot beverages 0.0323** 0.0323** 0.0323*** 0.0323*** 
 (0.0152) (0.0154) (0.00481) (0.00481) 
Danone*Treat     
Pastry [Reference] -0.0216*** -0.0216*** -0.0216**** -0.0216*** 
 (0.00459) (0.00409) (0.00326) (0.00326) 
Bread  and bakery 0.00547 0.00543 0.00547 0.00543 
 (0.0110) (0.0114) (0.00775) (0.00775) 
Cold drinks -0.000409 -0.000360 -0.000409 -0.000360 
 (0.0101) (0.00895) (0.00710) (0.00710) 
Dairy -0.000768 -0.000717 -0.000768 -0.000717 
 (0.00437) (0.00450) (0.00341) (0.00341) 
Coop*Treat     
Pastry [Reference]  -0.00166***  -0.00166* 
  (0.000165)  (0.000937) 
Bread  and bakery  0.000164  0.000164 
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 (0.000366)  (0.00148) 
Baby items  0.000294  0.000294 
  (0.000302)  (0.00172) 
Hot beverages  0.000175  0.000175 
  (0.000338)  (0.00168) 
Prepared  food  0.000542  0.000542 
  (0.00152)  (0.00505) 
Jarred goods  0.000176  0.000176 
  (0.000467)  (0.00204) 
Cold drinks  0.000452  0.000452 
  (0.000369)  (0.00194) 
Pet items  0.000624*  0.000624 
  (0.000362)  (0.00185) 
Cleaners  0.000715***  0.000715 
  (0.000264)  (0.00153) 
Personal care  0.000349  0.000349 
  (0.000233)  (0.00145) 







  (0.000271)  (0.00137) 
Dairy  0.000462*  0.000462 
  (0.000249)  (0.00135) 
Fresh pasta  -0.000467  -0.000467 
  (0.000325)  (0.00250) 
Barilla*Treat     
Pastry [Reference]  -0.00153***  -0.00153 
 





  (0.000402)  (0.00236) 
Foreign food  -0.000251  -0.000251 
  (0.000685)  (0.00757) 
Lavazza*Treat     
Hot beverages  -0.00170***  -0.00170 
  (0.000314)  (0.00205) 
Mukky*Treat     
Dairy  -0.00109***  -0.00109 
  (0.000176)  (0.00146) 
Sammontana*Treat     
Pastry  -0.00148***  -0.00148 
  (0.000251)  (0.00220) 
Ferrero*Treat     
Pastry [Reference]  -0.00160***  -0.00160 
  (0.000203)  (0.00166) 
Cold drinks  0.000430  0.000430 
  (0.000468)  (0.00410) 
Dairy  0.000465  0.000465 
  (0.000616)  (0.00666) 
Bread and bakery -0.000232 -0.000202 -0.000232 -0.000202 
 (0.000291) (0.000349) (0.000399) (0.000426) 
Baby items 0.000296 0.000313 0.000296 0.000313 
 (0.000242) (0.000285) (0.000511) (0.000541) 
Hot beverages -0.000137 -5.19e−05 -0.000137 -5.19e−05 
 (0.000278) (0.000316) (0.000481) (0.000518) 
Foreign food -4.75e−06 -0.000116 -4.75e−06 -0.000116 
 (0.000182) (0.000199) (0.00123) (0.00124) 
Prepared food -0.000194 -0.000289 -0.000194 -0.000289 
 (0.00138) (0.00144) (0.00113) (0.00116) 
Jarred goods -0.000166 -0.000242 -0.000166 -0.000242 
 (0.000415) (0.000433) (0.000493) (0.000511) 
Cold drinks -0.000274 -0.000356 -0.000274 -0.000356 
 (0.000306) (0.000338) (0.000501) (0.000526) 
Pet items -0.000470 -0.000528 -0.000470 -0.000528 
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 (0.000275) (0.000330) (0.000543) (0.000575) 
Cleaners -0.000490** -0.000580** -0.000490 -0.000580 
 (0.000218) (0.000235) (0.000395) (0.000414) 
Personal care -0.000214 -0.000301 -0.000214 -0.000301 
 (0.000174) (0.000207) (0.000320) (0.000332) 
Paramedic products -0.000200 -0.000180 -0.000200 -0.000180 
 (0.000297) (0.000334) (0.000779) (0.000822) 
Frozen foods -7.05e−05 0.000103 -7.05e−05 0.000103 
 (0.000207) (0.000252) (0.000455) (0.000500) 











 (0.000207) (0.000254) (0.000729) (0.000769) 
Company/Store FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Price Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 156,493 156,493 156,493 156,493 
R-squared 0.999 0.999   
Number of groups   4 4 
(1) and (2) show OLS with bootstrapped standard errors with 491 replications in  paren- 
theses; (3) and (4) show multilevel  estimates. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 














Algida Unilever 0.0415*** 0.0416*** 0.0415*** 0.0416*** 
  (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.00344) (0.00344) 
Axe Unilever 0.0760*** 0.0760*** 0.0760*** 0.0760*** 
  (0.0219) (0.0214) (0.00763) (0.00763) 
Badedas Unilever 0.0578*** 0.0578*** 0.0578*** 0.0578*** 
  (0.0178) (0.0175) (0.00531) (0.00531) 
Calvé Unilever 0.0680*** 0.0680*** 0.0680*** 0.0680*** 
  (0.00722) (0.00685) (0.00238) (0.00238) 
Carte d’Or Unilever 0.0438*** 0.0438*** 0.0438*** 0.0438*** 
  (0.0122) (0.0124) (0.00407) (0.00407) 
Cif Unilever 0.0620*** 0.0620*** 0.0620*** 0.0620*** 
  (0.0207) (0.0200) (0.00379) (0.00379) 
Clear Unilever 0.0620*** 0.0620*** 0.0620*** 0.0620*** 
  (0.0198) (0.0189) (0.00648) (0.00648) 
Coccolino Unilever 0.0614*** 0.0614*** 0.0614*** 0.0614*** 
  (0.0115) (0.0117) (0.00389) (0.00389) 
Cornetto Unilever 0.0413*** 0.0413*** 0.0413*** 0.0413*** 
  (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.00451) (0.00451) 
Dove Unilever 0.0737*** 0.0737*** 0.0737*** 0.0737*** 
  (0.00707) (0.00714) (0.00230) (0.00230) 
Fissan Unilever 0.0949*** 0.0950*** 0.0949*** 0.0950*** 
  (0.0133) (0.0132) (0.00502) (0.00502) 
Glysolid Unilever 0.0620*** 0.0620*** 0.0620*** 0.0620*** 
  (0.0112) (0.0120) (0.00648) (0.00648) 
Knorr Unilever 0.0658*** 0.0658*** 0.0658*** 0.0658*** 
  (0.00568) (0.00621) (0.00193) (0.00193) 
Lipton Unilever 0.0598*** 0.0598*** 0.0598*** 0.0598*** 
  (0.00986) (0.00948) (0.00310) (0.00310) 
Lysoform Unilever 0.0663*** 0.0663*** 0.0663*** 0.0663*** 
  (0.00897) (0.00901) (0.00307) (0.00306) 
Magnum Unilever 0.0619*** 0.0619*** 0.0619*** 0.0619*** 
  (0.0146) (0.0141) (0.00461) (0.00461) 
Mentadent Unilever 0.0568*** 0.0568*** 0.0568*** 0.0568*** 
  (0.00779) (0.00771) (0.00250) (0.00250) 
Sunsilk Unilever 0.0336*** 0.0336*** 0.0336*** 0.0336*** 
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 (0.0110) (0.00372) (0.00445) (0.00445) 
Svelto Unilever 0.0425*** 0.0425*** 0.0425*** 0.0425*** 
  (0.00917) (0.00943) (0.00338) (0.00338) 
Zendium Unilever 0.0794*** 0.0794*** 0.0794*** 0.0794*** 
  (0.0144) (0.0154) (0.00561) (0.00561) 
Bacetti Perugina Nestlé 0.0315 0.0316 0.0315*** 0.0316*** 
  (0.0260) (0.0276) (0.00863) (0.00863) 
Baci Nestlé -0.0142 -0.0142 -0.0142*** -0.0142*** 
  (0.0146) (0.0147) (0.00474) (0.00474) 
Belté Nestlé 0.00834 0.00832 0.00834 0.00832 
  (0.0191) (0.0199) (0.00612) (0.00612) 
Buitoni Nestlé -0.00425 -0.00424 -0.00425*** -0.00424*** 
  (0.00500) (0.00508) (0.00164) (0.00164) 
Fruit Joy Nestlé -0.0134 -0.0134 -0.0134* -0.0134* 
  (0.0266) (0.0260) (0.00781) (0.00781) 
Fruttolo Nestlé -0.000237 -0.000257 -0.000237 -0.000257 
  (0.0170) (0.0163) (0.00489) (0.00489) 
Galak Nestlé 0.00424 0.00421 0.00424 0.00421 
  (0.0202) (0.0212) (0.00659) (0.00659) 
Kit Kat Nestlé 0.0108 0.0108 0.0108** 0.0108** 
  (0.0141) (0.0151) (0.00459) (0.00459) 
Lc1 Nestlé -0.0466*** -0.0466*** -0.0466*** -0.0466*** 
  (0.0136) (0.0144) (0.00555) (0.00555) 
Lion Nestlé -0.00158 -0.00160 -0.00158 -0.00160 
  (0.0238) (0.0248) (0.00706) (0.00706) 
Maggi Nestlé -0.00338 -0.00340 -0.00338 -0.00340 
  (0.0208) (0.0218) (0.00649) (0.00649) 
Mare Fresco Nestlé -0.0594** -0.0593** -0.0594*** -0.0593*** 
  (0.0264) (0.0254) (0.00888) (0.00888) 
Mio Nestlé 0.0114 0.0114 0.0114*** 0.0114*** 
  (0.0110) (0.0113) (0.00360) (0.00360) 
Nescafé Nestlé -0.00536 -0.00534 -0.00536* -0.00534* 
  (0.00936) (0.00980) (0.00302) (0.00302) 
Nesquik Nestlé 0.00233 0.00233 0.00233 0.00233 
  (0.00961) (0.0954) (0.00291) (0.00291) 
Nestlé Nestlé 0.00511 0.00510 0.00511** 0.00510** 
  (0.00809) (0.00807) (0.00251) (0.00251) 
Nidina Nestlé 0.0237 0.0240 0.0237*** 0.0240*** 
  (0.0254) (0.0241) (0.00891) (0.00891) 
Orzoro Nestlé -0.0152 -0.0152 -0.0152*** -0.0152*** 
  (0.0119) (0.0126) (0.00392) (0.00392) 
Perugina Dolci Nestlé 0.00595 0.00594 0.00595*** 0.00594*** 
  (0.00728) (0.00728) (0.00230) (0.00230) 
Polo Nestlé -0.00608 -0.00609 -0.00608 -0.00609 
  (0.0207) (0.0219) (0.00670) (0.00670) 
Smarties Nestlé -0.00487 -0.00488 -0.00487 -0.00488 
  (0.0220) (0.0219) (0.00670) (0.00670) 
Vera Nestlé 0.0217 0.0217 0.0217*** 0.0217*** 
  (0.0256) (0.0255) (0.00819) (0.00819) 
Burn Coca Cola 0.00849 0.00848 0.00849 0.00848 
  (0.0324) (0.0322) (0.00671) (0.00671) 
Coca Cola Coca Cola 0.00846 0.00846 0.00846** 0.00846** 
  (0.0157) (0.0163) (0.00344) (0.00344) 
Fanta Coca Cola -0.0297* -0.0297* -0.0297*** -0.0297*** 
  (0.0174) (0.0167) (0.00402) (0.00402) 
Lilia Coca Cola -0.0190 -0.0190 -0.0190* -0.0190* 
  (0.0442) (0.0478) (0.0104) (0.0104) 
Powerade Coca Cola 0.00849 0.00848 0.00849 0.00848 
  (0.0306) (0.0321) (0.00671) (0.00671) 
Sprite Coca Cola 0.00846 0.00846 0.00846 0.00846 
  (0.0335) (0.0317) (0.00671) (0.00671) 
Kellogg’s Kellogg’s 0.0202*** 0.0202*** 0.0202*** 0.0202*** 
  (0.00778) (0.00759) (0.00254) (0.00254) 
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Pringles Kellogg’s 0.00113 0.00112 0.00113 0.00112 
  (0.0142) (0.0149) (0.00535) (0.00535) 
Bounty Mars 0.0817*** 0.0817*** 0.0817*** 0.0817*** 
  (0.0156) (0.0158) (0.00517) (0.00517) 
Catisfaction Mars 0.0820*** 0.0820*** 0.0820*** 0.0820*** 
  (0.0207) (0.0212) (0.00689) (0.00689) 
Cesar Mars 0.0831*** 0.0831*** 0.0831*** 0.0831*** 
  (0.00974) (0.0101) (0.00334) (0.00334) 
Kitekat Mars 0.0722*** 0.0722*** 0.0722*** 0.0722*** 
  (0.0164) (0.0158) (0.00504) (0.00504) 
M&M’s Mars 0.0771*** 0.0772*** 0.0771*** 0.0772*** 
  (0.0228) (0.0218) (0.00667) (0.00667) 
Mars Mars 0.0701*** 0.0701*** 0.0701*** 0.0701*** 
  (0.0166) (0.0165) (0.00504) (0.00504) 
Pedigree Mars 0.0749*** 0.0749*** 0.0749*** 0.0749*** 
  (0.0103) (0.0107) (0.00326) (0.00326) 
Perfect Fit Mars 0.0728*** 0.0728*** 0.0728*** 0.0728*** 
  (0.0207) (0.0221) (0.00667) (0.00667) 
Sheba Mars 0.0700*** 0.0700*** 0.0700*** 0.0700*** 
  (0.0133) (0.0128) (0.00416) (0.00416) 
Snickers Mars 0.0911*** 0.0911*** 0.0911*** 0.0911*** 
  (0.0253) (0.0258) (0.00923) (0.00923) 
Suzi Wan Mars 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.168*** 
  (0.00635) (0.00650) (0.0150) (0.0150) 
Twix Mars 0.0808*** 0.0808*** 0.0808*** 0.0808*** 
  (0.0214) (0.0218) (0.00667) (0.00667) 
Uncle Ben’s Mars 0.166*** 0.166*** 0.166*** 0.166*** 
  (0.0115) (0.0111) (0.0164) (0.0164) 
Whiskas Mars 0.0784*** 0.0783*** 0.0784*** 0.0783*** 
  (0.0103) (0.00957) (0.00323) (0.00323) 
Gatorade PepsiCo -0.0781 -0.0781 -0.0781*** -0.0781*** 
  (0.0575) (0.0594) (0.00696) (0.00696) 
Lay’s PepsiCo -0.0826* -0.0826* -0.0826*** -0.0826*** 
  (0.0469) (0.0500) (0.00555) (0.00555) 
Pepsi PepsiCo -0.0741** -0.0741* -0.0741*** -0.0741*** 
  (0.0394) (0.0391) (0.00458) (0.00458) 
Seven Up PepsiCo 0.0791 0.0791 0.0791*** 0.0791*** 
  (0.106) (0.0996) (0.0135) (0.0135) 
Figaro Mondelez -0.0151* -0.0152* -0.0151*** -0.0152*** 
  (0.00911) (0.00867) (0.00545) (0.00545) 
Halls Mondelez -0.00587 -0.00586 -0.00587 -0.00586 
  (0.00941) (0.00892) (0.00575) (0.00575) 
Kraft Mondelez -0.00582 -0.00583 -0.00582 -0.00583 
  (0.00905) (0.00919) (0.00588) (0.00588) 
Mikado Mondelez -0.00141 -0.00141 -0.00141 -0.00141 
  (0.00790) (0.00825) (0.00582) (0.00582) 
Milka Mondelez -0.00835** -0.00835** -0.00835*** -0.00835*** 
  (0.00345) (0.00395) (0.00243) (0.00243) 
Nabisco Oreo Mondelez -0.00259 -0.00255 -0.00259 -0.00255 
  (0.0188) (0.0193) (0.0106) (0.0106) 
Oro Saiwa Mondelez -0.00411 -0.00410 -0.00411 -0.00410 
  (0.00501) (0.00492) (0.00330) (0.00330) 













  (0.0104) (0.0110) (0.00725) (0.00725) 
Saiwa Mondelez -0.00903 -0.00904 -0.00903 -0.00904 
  (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.00655) (0.00655) 
Sottilette Mondelez -0.00905 -0.00905 -0.00905* -0.00905* 
  (0.00716) (0.00705) (0.00471) (0.00471) 
Toblerone Mondelez -0.0267* -0.0267* -0.0267*** -0.0267*** 
  (0.0140) (0.0148) (0.0102) (0.0102) 
Tuc Mondelez -0.00904 -0.00904 -0.00904* -0.00904* 
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 (0.00713) (0.00689) (0.00471) (0.00471) 
Twinings ABF 0.0323** 0.0323** 0.0323*** 0.0323*** 
  (0.0161) (0.0144) (0.00481) (0.00481) 
Actimel Danone -0.0214*** -0.0214*** -0.0214*** -0.0214*** 
  (0.00620) (0.00605) (0.00426) (0.00426) 
Activia Danone -0.0249*** -0.0249*** -0.0249*** -0.0249*** 
  (0.00552) (0.00520) (0.00372) (0.00372) 
Danacol Danone -0.0221*** -0.0221*** -0.0221*** -0.0221*** 
  (0.00686) (0.00662) (0.00476) (0.00476) 
Danette Danone -0.0221** -0.0220** -0.0221*** -0.0220*** 
  (0.00936) (0.00921) (0.00659) (0.00659) 
Danone Danone -0.0221*** -0.0221*** -0.0221*** -0.0221*** 
  (0.00569) (0.00568) (0.00405) (0.00405) 
Vitasnella Danone -0.0206*** -0.0206*** -0.0206*** -0.0206*** 
  (0.00381) (0.00385) (0.00265) (0.00265) 
Vitasnella Danone Danone -0.0220** -0.0220** -0.0220*** -0.0220*** 
  (0.00912) (0.00926) (0.00659) (0.00659) 




Barilla Barilla  -0.00167**  -0.00167 
   (0.000665)  (0.00729) 
Mulino Bianco Barilla  -0.00135***  -0.00135 
   (0.000114)  (0.00138) 
Pavesi Barilla  -0.00139***  -0.00139 
   (0.000198)  (0.00230) 
Wasa Barilla  -0.00129**  -0.00129 
   (0.000554)  (0.00644) 
Lavazza Lavazza  -0.00160***  -0.00160 
   (0.000182)  (0.00200) 
Mukky Mukky  -0.00125***  -0.00125 
   (0.000124)  (0.00143) 
Sammontana Sammontana  -0.00130***  -0.00130 
   (0.000185)  (0.00218) 
Duplo Ferrero  -0.00129**  -0.00129 
   (0.000561)  (0.00644) 
Estathe Ferrero  -0.00131***  -0.00131 
   (0.000289)  (0.00343) 
Ferrero Ferrero  -0.00130***  -0.00130 
   (0.000323)  (0.00415) 
Kinder Ferrero  -0.00142***  -0.00142 
   (0.000186)  (0.00220) 
Tic Tac Ferrero  -0.00135***  -0.00135 
   (0.000310)  (0.00376) 
Tronky Ferrero  -0.00128**  -0.00128 
   (0.000561)  (0.00644) 
Company/Store FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Price  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  156,493 156,493 156,493 156,493 
R-squared  0.99 0.99   
Number of groups    4 4 
(1) and (2) show OLS with bootstrapped standard errors with 491 replications in parentheses; 
(3) and (4) show multilevel estimates. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table A.9: The effect of information on Behind the Brands total score on ranked companies’ market 
shares (Above/Below the median score). 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Mkt shares Mkt shares Mkt shares Mkt shares 
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Treat*Above the median 






















Store FE Yes No Yes No 
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,287 16,287 16,287 16,287 
R-squared 
Number of groups 




(1) and (2) show OLS with bootstrapped standard errors with 491 replications in   parentheses; 
(3) and (4) show multilevel  estimates. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table A.10: The Behind the Brands scorecard without the self-regarding domains (Climate and Trans- 
parency). 
 
 Land Women Farmers Workers Water TOTAL 
Unilever 7 6 8 8 7 36 
Nestlé 8 5 7 6 7 33 
Coca Cola 8 6 3 6 6 29 
Kellogg’s 5 6 5 3 5 24 
Mars 4 5 5 4 4 22 
PepsiCo 7 4 3 3 5 22 
Mondelez 4 6 4 4 2 20 
General Mills 2 3 3 3 6 17 
ABF 5 3 3 4 3 18 
Danone 2 2 3 3 4 14 
 
 
Table A.11: The effect of information on Behind the Brands total score on ranked companies’ market 




















Totalscore 0.0650***  0.0650***  
 (0.000745)  (0.000598)  
Company/Store FE No Yes No Yes 
Store FE Yes No Yes No 
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,287 16,287 16,287 16,287 
R-squared 0.448 0.977   
Number of groups   4 4 
(1) and (2) show OLS with bootstrapped standard errors with 491 replications in parentheses; 
(3) and (4) show multilevel  estimates. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.12: The effect of information on Behind the Brands total score on ranked companies’ market 











Totalscore*Treatment 0.00152 0.00286*** 0.00152 0.00286*** 
 (0.00133) (0.000207) (0.00107) (0.000250) 
DpostTreatment 0.155 0.0955*** 0.155** 0.0955*** 
 (0.103) (0.0125) (0.0754) (0.0154) 











Store FE Yes No Yes No 
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,287 16,287 
  
R-squared 
Number of groups 




(1) and (2) show OLS with bootstrapped standard errors with 491 replications in parentheses; 
(3) and (4) show multilevel  estimates. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 












































 (0.000507) (6.84e−05) (0.000423) (9.26e−05) 
Company/Store FE No Yes No Yes 
Store FE Yes No Yes No 
Week FE Yes Yes Yes  
Price Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,287 16,287 16,287 16,287 
No. of groups   4 4 
R-squared 0.450 0.977   
(1) and (2) show OLS with bootstrapped standard errors with 491 replications in paren- 
theses; (3) and (4) show multilevel  estimates. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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B Appendix.  Cluster refinement 
 
Our experiment took place in four stores that can be seen as clusters. However, standard 
econometric procedures rely on asymptotic properties which do not hold with very few clusters, 
as in our case. In section 4.2 we have adopted a multi-level and a bootstrap approach to show how 
two different methodologies lead similar results. In this section we perform a cluster analysis with 
the use of clusters refinement and we show that we are able to replicate our results as far as the 
number of clusters grows. In favour of the need of a more refined clustering consider that product 
level dynamics are the most important drivers of sales per day (more than store effects) (i.e., 
temperature and advertising campaigns creating taste shocks are all factors producing stronger 
correlation within than across product classes, with product dimension being therefore much 
more relevant than the store effect). Hence it is reasonable to assume that correlation within 
product type is stronger than between products. If the role of clustering standard errors is that of 
taking into account the fact that correlation within groups is stronger than across groups across 
the relevant discriminating dimensions, the product dimension is the most relevant to be taken 
into account. Hence cluster refinement considering not only store but also product level therefore 
makes sense and seems more accurate than just clustering standard errors at store level. 
 
Table B.1 shows our benchmark estimates with both OLS and Wild Cluster Bootstrap, with 
standard errors clustered at store level. While Wild Cluster Bootstrap is particularly suited 
when the number of clusters is small (Cameron et al., 2008), our estimates do not show significant 
changes, even though standard errors decrease with the Wild Bootstrap approach. 
 
In Table B.2 we perform OLS estimates with refined clusters. Columns 1 and 2 consider clusters 
at store/week/brand level and columns 3 and 4 consider clusters at store/week/brand/class of 
product level. Different refinements do not lead to different results in terms of significance, with 
the exception of the treatment effect on Mondelez company being significant with more refined 
clusters. Also, these results are consistent with our bootstrap and multilevel estimates shown in 
section 4.2. 
Table B.1: The effect of information on Behind the Brands scorecard poster on companies’ market shares, 

















Unilever*Treat 0.0614 0.0614 0.0614 0.0614 
 (0.114) (0.114) (0.0906) (0.0906) 
Nestlé*Treat -0.00120 -0.00120 -0.00120 -0.00120 
 (0.0988) (0.0988) (0.00554) (0.00554) 
Coca Cola*Treat -0.00323 -0.00323 -0.00323 -0.00323 
 (0.139) (0.139) (0.0195) (0.0194) 
Kellogg’s*Treat 0.0180 0.0180 0.0180 0.0180 
 (0.0753) (0.0753) (0.0599) (0.0599) 
Mars*Treat 0.0783 0.0783 0.0783 0.0783 
 (0.0941) (0.0941) (0.116) (0.116) 
PepsiCo*Treat -0.0710 -0.0710 -0.0710 -0.0710 
 (0.178) (0.178) (0.158) (0.158) 
Mondelez*Treat -0.00777 -0.00777 -0.00777 -0.00777 
 (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0193) (0.0193) 
ABF*Treat 0.0323 0.0323 0.0323 0.0323 
 (0.0787) (0.0787) (0.118) (0.118) 
Danone*Treat -0.0219 -0.0219 -0.0219 -0.0219 
 (0.0233) (0.0233) (0.0235) (0.0235) 
Coop*Treat  -0.00137  -0.00137 
  (0.00155)  (0.00203) 
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Barilla*Treat  -0.00138  -0.00138 
  (0.00155)  (0.00159) 
Lavazza*Treat  -0.00156  -0.00156 
  (0.00155)  (0.00180) 
Mukki*Treat  -0.00126  -0.00126 
  (0.00159)  (0.00187) 
Sammontana*Treat  -0.00128  -0.00128 
  (0.00154)  (0.00148) 











Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Price Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 156,493 156,493 156,493 156,493 
R-squared 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
No. of clusters 4 4 4 4 
(1) and (2) show OLS with clustered standard errors at store level in parenthesis; (3) 
and (4) show Wild Cluster Bootstrap with store clusters in   parenthesis. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table B.2: The effect of information on Behind the Brands scorecard poster on companies’ market shares, 

















Unilever*Treat 0.0614*** 0.0614*** 0.0614*** 0.0614*** 
 (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.00430) (0.00430) 
Coca Cola*Treat -0.00120 -0.00120 -0.00120 -0.00120 
 (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.00479) (0.00479) 
Nestlé*Treat -0.00323 -0.00323 -0.00323 -0.00323 
 (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0165) 
Kellogg’s*Treat 0.0180 0.0180 0.0180* 0.0180* 
 (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0103) (0.0103) 
Mars*Treat 0.0783*** 0.0783*** 0.0783*** 0.0783*** 
 (0.00816) (0.00816) (0.00749) (0.00749) 
PepsiCo*Treat -0.0710 -0.0710 -0.0710* -0.0710* 
 (0.0482) (0.0482) (0.0429) (0.0429) 
Mondelez*Treat -0.00777 -0.00777 -0.00777** -0.00777** 
 (0.00565) (0.00565) (0.00354) (0.00354) 
ABF*Treat 0.0323 0.0323 0.0323 0.0323 
 (0.0405) (0.0405) (0.0208) (0.0208) 
Danone*Treat -0.0219*** -0.0219*** -0.0219*** -0.0219*** 
 (0.00788) (0.00788) (0.00421) (0.00421) 
Coop*Treat  -0.00137***  -0.00137*** 
  (0.000499)  (5.03e-05) 
Barilla*Treat  -0.00138***  -0.00138*** 
  (0.000461)  (0.000138) 
Lavazza*Treat  -0.00156***  -0.00156*** 
  (0.000380)  (0.000263) 
Mukki*Treat  -0.00126  -0.00126*** 
  (0.000771)  (0.000175) 
Sammontana*Treat  -0.00128***  -0.00128*** 
  (0.000375)  (0.000257) 
Ferrero*Treat  -0.00137***  -0.00137*** 
  (0.000277)  (0.000174) 
Price Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Company/Store FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Joint significance of     
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ranked brands F(9 ; 31,315/84,673) 15.90 (0.000) 15.90 (0.000) 39.29 (0.000) 39.29 (0.000) 
non-ranked brands F(6 ; 31,315/84,673)  9.94 (0.000)  165.31 (0.000) 
top 5 ranked brands F(5 ; 31,315/84,673) 26.13 (0.000) 26.13 (0.000) 63.32 (0.000) 63.32 (0.000) 
bottom 4 ranked brands F(4 ; 31,315/84,673) 3.10 (0.015) 3.10 (0.015) 9.26 (0.000) 9.26 (0.000) 
 
Observations 156,493 156,493 156,493 156,493 
R-squared 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
No. of clusters 31,316 31,316 84,674 84,674 
(1) and (2) show OLS with clustered standard errors at store/week/brand level in parenthesis; (3) and (4) 
show OLS with clustered standard errors at store/week/brand/class of product level in parenthesis. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
